Working Papers
Model-Assisted Inference for Conditional Average Treatment Effects with High-Dimensional Controls (with Manu Navjeevan).
In-Progress
Empirical Crypto Asset Pricing with High-Dimensional Factor Models (JMP).
Draft very soon!
Competing Fiat Moneys and Nominal Rigidities (with Basil Halperin and J. Zachary Mazlish).
Abstract: Monetary economics traditionally does not consider a market-based benchmark: when we study trade, we start with a benchmark of free trade; when we study monetary economics, however, we start with a benchmark of central banking. This paper aims to fill that gap. We study competition among unbacked, costless (“fiat”) moneys. First, under flexible prices, there is a first welfare theorem for money: When producers of such moneys have commitment technology — such as blockchain technology — then competition implements the optimum quantity of money. Second, under nominal rigidities where the competing moneys also serve as competing units of account, then competition can also implement the equivalent of “optimal monetary policy” to avoid macroeconomic fluctuations, if the competing moneys pay interest.
The Heterogeneous Effects of QE on Corporate Bonds and Firm Outcomes (with Jesper Bojeryd).
Model-Assisted Inference for Conditional Average Treatment Effects with High-Dimensional Controls (with Manu Navjeevan).
In-Progress
Empirical Crypto Asset Pricing with High-Dimensional Factor Models (JMP).
Draft very soon!
Competing Fiat Moneys and Nominal Rigidities (with Basil Halperin and J. Zachary Mazlish).
Abstract: Monetary economics traditionally does not consider a market-based benchmark: when we study trade, we start with a benchmark of free trade; when we study monetary economics, however, we start with a benchmark of central banking. This paper aims to fill that gap. We study competition among unbacked, costless (“fiat”) moneys. First, under flexible prices, there is a first welfare theorem for money: When producers of such moneys have commitment technology — such as blockchain technology — then competition implements the optimum quantity of money. Second, under nominal rigidities where the competing moneys also serve as competing units of account, then competition can also implement the equivalent of “optimal monetary policy” to avoid macroeconomic fluctuations, if the competing moneys pay interest.
The Heterogeneous Effects of QE on Corporate Bonds and Firm Outcomes (with Jesper Bojeryd).